The
Rise of Election Monitoring
WHAT
MAKES ELECTIONS
FREE
AND FAIR?
Jergen Elklit & Palle
Svensson
Jergen Elklit is associate professor of political
science at the University of Aarhus,
Denmark. He has served as an
advisor on electoral systems and democratization and as, an election monitor in
Africa, Asia, and Europe. In 1994 he was a member of the South
4fricän Independent Electoral Commission. PalIe Svensson is associate professor
of political science at the University of Aarhus and has advised on and
monitored elections in African
countries. An earlier version of this essay was presented at the Nordic
Political Science Association’s Triennial in Helsinki in August 1996.
It was late in the afternoon in Kampala on 31 March 1994. Journalists
were waiting impatiently for an announcement from international election
observers. United nations
officials stated for the third time their
argument that the observers. Should declare the March 28 elections for
Uganda’s Constituent Assembly “free and fair~” But the election observers
avoided that phrase. They had monitored only part of the electoral process;
moreover, they knew that calling the elections “free and fair” would hinder or
preclude discussion of the problems they had discovered. In the end, the elections, in Uganda – which
were no worse than many other elections that have taken place in emerging democracies—were
not declared “free and fair.”
As this incident shows,
election observers encounter great pressure - and not just from overeager
journalists – to judge whether the elections in question were “free and fair,”
Indeed, sometimes it seem that this is all people want to know. “Free and fair”
has become the catchphrase of UN officials, journalists, politicians, and
political scientists alike. It
exemplifies what Giovanni Sartori once called “conceptual stretching.” “The
wider the world under investigation, the more we need conceptual tools that are
able to travel.” But what actually constitutes a “free and fair” election? Does
the phrase mean only that the election was “acceptable,” or does it imply
something more?
International organizations have long been
involved in monitoring and assessing elections and referendums. Especially
notable has been the UN’s role in referendums on independence, which began to
take place in the late 1950s. Before the
UN could recognize former colonies and trust territories as independent states,
it had to know whether these votes had been “free and fair.”2 This
concept supposedly made its first appearance in a report on Togoland’s 1956 independence
referendum.3
The UN’s involvement in the November 1989
referendum in Namibia was fundamentally different: In that case the vote was
not just an element of the colony’s long liberation process but also an
integral part of the UN peacekeeping efforts in the area. In February 1990, the
UN supervised presidential and legislative elections in Nicaragua. Interestingly,
this was done at the request of the country itself, and as part of an
assessment of the entire electoral process, not just of election-day events.
Thus the UN acquired a major role in the electoral process of an independent
member country—something that not all UN members saw as a positive development.
Subsequent elections and, referendums in
which the UN has been directly involved, either as part of peacekeeping efforts
or because the countries in question .sought its approval include those in Haiti (December
1990), Angola (September 1992), Cambodia (May 1993), and Mozambique (October
1994). One might add to that list Eritrea (April 1993), South Africa (April
‘1994), and Malawi (June 1993 and May 1994), though the UN’s involvement in
these cases was less extensive and due in part to other factors.4
Besides the civil war – torn countries
noted above, many other nations have taken dramatic steps toward democracy
during the past decade. In many cases,
individual Western countries have provided support these developments, in other
cases, the primary actors have been international organizations other than the,
UN (especially the Organization of American States, the European Union, the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Inter-Parliamentary
Union, and Commonwealth Secretariat). Both national and international
governmental organizations (NGOs) have also become involved. Many, of these
NGOs have received substantial funding from governments other public sources.5
Over the past decade,
countless election ., observers have been dispatched to every region of the
globe. This increased activity has been accompanied by an intensified demand
for standardized assessment criteria, but the development of “checklists” has
been hindered by disagreement over what should be included. In
addition, cooperation among different countries organizations and election authorities
has been uneven. Thus a discussion of the basis on which an election or
referendum can be labeled “free and fair,” or at least “acceptable,” long
overdue.
Although criteria for
declaring an election “free and fair” have been developed in various contexts,
translating such theoretical concepts into a comprehensive list of factors to
consider has proved difficult. Equally daunting are the methodological problems
of determining whether a particular electoral process meets the established
criteria and combining the different “measurements” on various dimensions into
a single score. One approach is to study various aspects of the process (e.g.,
the electoral system, the voter-registration system, media access, campaign
rules, ballot counting) and then assess whether conditions within each area
promote or hamper the freedom and fairness of the election.’ Here we take a
different approach. Drawing on the work of Robert Dahl, we start by examining
the relationship between elections and. Democratic development. This provides a
basis for defining the concepts “free” and fair.” We then present a list of
assessment criteria and examine the value of such a list in actual practice.
It
is not surprising that politicians and voters in formerly colonized or
nondemocratic countries - as well as individuals, countries, and international
organizations that subscribe to democratic principles – take a great interest
in elections and referendums. Yet this has contributed to development of a
distorted picture of the process of democratic transition: The poll itself has
become the focus of attention, acquiring an importance that has no basis in
either democratic theory or practical politics.
A
common misperception is that any country in which elections have been held
without too many obvious irregularities can be called a “democracy.” This
attitude has been most easily discerned in U.S. policy toward some South and
Central American countries, but it can also be identified in the foreign policy
of other nations.’ Yet if the ultimate objective is to encourage
continuous development toward a well functioning democracy, the prerequisites of
democratic elections must not be ignored.
Robert
Dahl has identified a number of
“institutional prerequisites” of democracy. One of these is free and
fair elections. Yet Dahl does not indicate what he means by “free and fair,”
other than that “elected officials are chosen in frequent and fairly conducted
elections in which coercion is comparatively uncommon.”11 This
leaves several questions unanswered: Can elections be free and fair if part of
the adult population has no right to vote? What if not all adult citizens have
the opportunity to run for office? And what if there is no freedom of speech,
assembly, or movement? In other words, do “free and fair” elections not require
the fulfillment of all of Dahl’s other prerequisites of democracy? Dahl himself
has argued that elections should be held later in the democratic-transition
process than has often been the case. This implies that a number of other
preconditions of democracy must be met,
at least in part, before free and’ fair elections can be held.’2
The concepts “free”
and “fair,” then, must be clearly defined and distinguished from other
preconditions of democracy. They must also be translated into specific criteria
that can be used to evaluate elections. The electoral process itself must be
broken down into its component phases, each of which corresponds with certain
evaluation criteria.
Freedom, as Dahl notes, contrasts with coercion. ‘Freedom
entails the right and the opportunity to choose one thing over another.
Coercion implies the absence of choice, either formally or in reality: either-
all options but one are disallowed, or certain choices would have negative
consequences for one’s own or one’s family’s safety, welfare, or dignity.
Fairness means impartiality. The opposite of fairness is
unequal ‘treatment of equals, whereby some people (or groups) are given
unreasonable advantages. Thus’ fairness involves both regularity (the
unbiased application of rules) and “reasonableness (the not-too-unequal
distribution of relevant resources among competitors).
In practice, it is not
always easy to distinguish between freedom and fairness, and any categorization
of various elements of the electoral process should be approached with caution.
In general, however, the “freedom” dimension should include elements relating
to voters’ opportunity to participate in the election without coercion or
restrictions of any kind (with the ‘possible exception of economic
limitations). Thus “freedom” primarily deals with the “rules of the game.”
Which of the two
dimensions is more important? ‘We hold that freedom must be given priority,
because it is a precondition for democracy and for elections as a means to that
end: Without rules granting formal political freedoms, the question of the fair
application of rules is meaningless, and the question of equality of resources
irrelevant.
It may be just as
difficult to distinguish between the two aspects of fairness as between freedom
and fairness, because both regularity and reasonableness involve the notion of
impartiality. Yet they should be separated to the extent possible.
Regularity—which involves impartial application of the election law,
constitutional provisions, and other regulations - is the more specific of the
two and must be present in a high degree before an election can be accepted.
Reasonableness - which concerns securing roughly equal opportunities for the exercise
of political freedom - is more general, and is impossible to achieve in full or
even to a high degree. In fact, we know of no democracy that has distributed
relevant political resources equally among political competitors.
Thus in assessing the fairness of an
election, or a referendum, it is more important to discern how the rules are
applied than to determine whether individuals and groups have ideal
opportunities. This does not mean that reasonableness is unimportant. Indeed, a
broadening of access to relevant political resources and opportunities is a
clear indication of a regime’s progress toward democracy. In competitive
elections, the opportunities available to various groups are especially
important. There should be no question of any particular group or political
party having a greater chance of winning the election than any other group. The
standard formulation used in the preparatory phase of the April 1994 elections
in South Africa—the notion of “leveling the playing field”—epitomizes this
aspect of “fairness.”’3
In addition to clarifying core concepts,
it is important to distinguish among events before, during, and after the
actual polling. The election day itself is only part of the electoral process;
thus observation missions consisting of short stays around election day are
fundamentally flawed. The pre-election
period is especially important: it is at this stage that observers must assess
whether the election law and the constitution guarantee the freedom of the
voters, and verify that relevant resources are not too unequally distributed
among competing parties and candidates. The importance of evaluating
pre-election day events has been increasingly acknowledged by the UN and other
organizations, particularly since the Nicaraguan operation of 1990.
The period after the actual polling must
also be considered. At this stage, the crucial issue is the fair and regular
application of rules. The counting of ballots should be carefully controlled to
prevent fraud, the
results should be reported immediately, and complaints
about the electoral process should be handled impartially.
1
Combining the two principal dimensions of election assessment with the three observational phases yields the checklist presented in Table I. The checklist is a useful device, but it is not without problems. Although it is based both on relevant literature’ and on practical experience, it is “certainly not exhaustive. Moreover it represents a
schematic outline of
the assessment process, not a detailed and unambiguous set of instructions.
This gives rise to a twofold problem of reliability. First, election observers
may disagree on the extent to which the individual criteria have been
fulfilled. Second, the list does not indicate the relative importance of the
various criteria, If some criteria have been fulfilled, while others have not,
or if a certain criterion has been fulfilled only partially,- the observers
must rely heavily on their own judgment. Nevertheless, some general guidelines can
be provided.
Although the election law
(and related regulations) of the country in question may not be ideal in the
eyes of international election observers, the observers’ main duty is to
determine whether or not the electoral.
Table I — Checklist for Election Assessment
Freedom
of movement A
transparent electoral process
Freedom
of speech
(for candidates, the media, An
election act and an electoral system
voters,
and others) that
grant no special privileges to any Freedom of assembly political
party or social group
Freedom
of association Absence
of impediments to inclusion
Freedom from
fear in connection with the election in
the electoral register
and the electoral campaign Establishment
of an independent
Absence of
impediments to standing for election and
impartial election commission
(for both political parties and independent
candidates) Impartial
treatment of candidates by
Equal
and universal suffrage the
police, the army, and the courts of law Equal
opportunities for political parties
and
independent candidates to stand for
for
election.
Impartial
voter.education programs
An
orderly election campaign (observance
of
a code of conduct)
Equal
access to publicly controlled media
Impartial
allotment of public funds to
political
parties (if relevant)
No
misuse of government facilities
for
campaign purposes
]
On Polling Day Opportunities to participate in the
election Access to all polling
stations for
representatives
of the political parties,
accredited
local and international
election
observers. and the media
Secrecy
of the ballot
Absence
of intimidation of voters
Effective
design of ballot papers
Proper
ballot boxes
Impartial
assistance to voters (if necessary)
Proper counting procedures
Proper
treatment of void ballot papers
Proper
precautionary measures when
transporting
election material
Impartial
protection of polling stations
After Polling Day Legal Possibilities of complaint Official
and expeditious announcement of
election
results
Impartial
treatment of any election
complaints
Impartial
reports on the election
results
by the media
Acceptance
of the
election results by
everyone
involved
process conforms to that law. The
checklist in Table 1 should prove useful in this regard: It can help observers
keep track of the various components of the electoral process and compare them
against the election law (with which the observers should be thoroughly
familiar).
0f course, electoral processes differ, as
do political and social conditions and democratic-transition processes
themselves. Thus it is not possible to attach absolute weights to the various
criteria listed in Table1, for their importance varies with the electoral
context. In general, however items in the “free” column are more important than
those in the “fair” column, and within the “fair” column, correct and impartial
application of the election law and other relevant regulations is more
important than ideal opportunities for political competition. Whereas freedom
is a necessary - though not sufficient – condition for an election’s
acceptability, the combination of freedom and the fair application of
electoral rules is both necessary and sufficient for such acceptability. For an
election to be free and fair, however, the main competitors should have had at
least some access to campaign resources and the media, even if that’ access was
not fully equal.
What happens before and after polling day
is at least as important as what happens on polling day itself. In particular,
the observance of political freedoms in the pre-election period is a
prerequisite for the acceptability of an election, and even for the mounting of
an electoral ‘observation. If these rules are broken, the election cannot be
declared acceptable, much less free and fair. After the election, all that is
required is voluntary acceptance of the outcome by all serious political
contenders. If the results are disputed, it is essential to analyze the
reasons for the
disagreement and to observe how complaints are treated.
Of course what happens on
pooling day is also important. Yet election day activities are often
overemphasized; moreover, they are not always reported adequately. It is not enough merely to
observe and report irregularities; rather, they must be evaluated in relation
to reasonable expectations. What matters is how widespread they are, how
serious they are, whether they represent a clear tendency (especially in favor
of current officeholders), and how significant they are in affecting the final
results.
To be sure, irregularities should be noted, and
suggestions for remedying them should be given. But irregularities that are a
result of deficits in technical capacity or experience are less serious than
deliberate attempts to manipulate the results. In fact, irregularities on
polling day seriously threaten freedom and fairness only to the extent that
they are extensive, systematic, or decisive in a close race.
In addition to determining which criteria
have been fulfilled and deciding on the relative importance of the various
items observers should also judge whether the election or referendum under the
given circumstances reflects the expressed will of the people: This is, after
all, the main reason for conducting elections, and irregularities and technical
problems should be assessed from this perspective.
Observers should also
evaluate the ‘election in the context of the specific democratic-transition
process. Will the election despite possible technical shortcomings—stimulate
further democratization by increasing respect for political freedoms,
strengthening adherence to the election law, enhancing political contestation
through broader access to relevant resources, involving more people in the
political process, or improving the quality of the political debate? Although
some would categorize this as a “political” judgment, it can be argued that it
legitimately falls within the domain of election observation. If observers are
to view an election not as an isolated event but as part •of the
democratization process, they cannot avoid considering whether and how it
contributes to that process.
It should be emphasized, however, that while observers
may go beyond a narrow technical assessment of elections to evaluate the degree
to which the preferences of the electorate have been expressed and the role
that the election played in the democratization process’: they still do’ not
have license to pass judgments of a broader nature? An election should not be
deemed acceptable because it contributes to political stability or law
and order in the country or the region. Such judgments may be both relevant and
expedient, but it is not the role of election observers to make them. All they
can do is deliver relevant information about the electoral component of the
overall situation: it is up to national governments and international ‘ bodies to draw
the political conclusions.
It is not easy to establish the precise
line between legitimate an illegitimate assessments; moreover, not all election
observers acknowledge the distinction is readily, apparent when a delegation
of election observers include a number of parliamentarians, who are used to
making political judgments and willing to take responsibility for them. Such observers often refuse to accept the
inherent limitations of their role.
Asimilar problem of demarcation arises when international organizations
or national governments have difficulty separating the electoral assessment
from an assessment from an analysis of the political consequences of that
assessment. Again, these are two different kinds of activities, which should be
carried out by different organizations.
A few examples will illustrate some of the
problems of election observation and assessment mentioned above. The June 1992 parliamentary elections in
Mongolia were praiseworthy at east one respect: the only slightly reformed,
former communist Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party (MPRP) had introduced a
by-and-large exemplary election law, which was observed in all essentials. Yet
the MPRP had also installed an electoral system that was perhaps the most
undemocratic in the world (majority elections in multimember constituencies,
with each voter required to cast exactly the same number of votes as the number
of parliamentary seats to be filled by the constituency). Predictably,
the MPRP won 93 percent of the available seats with only 57 percent of the
vote. Of course, 57 percent is a clear majority. Yet this left more than
40 percent of the electorate virtually without parliamentary representation at
a time when their country’s social and political systems were being totally
reformed. What does this mean for the election’s status as “free and fair”? Can
an election conducted under such a system even be termed “acceptable”? Fortunately,
the electoral system was replaced with an ordinary first-past-the-post system
for the June 1996 parliamentary elections.
In the case of Kenya’s December 1992
presidential, parliamentary, and local elections, many elements of the
electoral process were questionable.’6 There was considerable
evidence of manipulation on the part of President Daniel arap Moi and his
party, the Kenya African National Unity (KANU). Yet the situation appeared to
improve as polling day approached, resulting in a relatively orderly vote, all
things considered. The poor showing of the opposition parties was due largely
to their own failure to work together and only in part to the
various tricks of KANU, the chairman of the electoral commission, and others.
Can such elections be termed “free and fair”?’7 To what extent can a
degree of progress toward democracy compensate for irregularities and disregard
of the rules?
In elections for Uganda’s Constituent Assembly in
March 1994, political parties—which had been associated with the country’s
bloody ethnic clashes—were forbidden to field candidates, while individual candidates
were given carte blanche, a decision that provoked considerable
dissatisfaction. Moreover, a serious voter-registration problem arose. The plan
was to complete the voting in one day and count the ballots before dark: The
voters were therefore distributed among polling stations of no more than six
hundred electors. Technical difficulties, however, prevented the voter lists
from being published; consequently, people did not know which polling station
to go to. This resulted in a good deal of confusion on election day. Does the
exclusion of political ‘parties from the electoral process preclude an election
from being “free and fair?” And do technical problems with voter registration
render an election unacceptable?
In South Africa’s April 1994 elections for parliament
and regional assemblies, considerable efforts were made to involve all citizens
and parties in the process of democratization and reconciliation. Yet it was
difficult to ensure equality of opportunity for the country’s many different political
formations and social groups. There were plenty of
administrative and procedural problems as well. What
are we to make of the dual character of this particular electoral process? Was
it appropriate that the South African Independent Electoral Commission (IEC)
itself issued the verdict of “substantially free and fair”?
In Tanzania’s October 1994 local
elections, only about half the electorate registered to vote—a disappointing
figure compared with those of previous local elections. On the other hand,
candidates from parties other than the autocratic Revolutionary Party of
Tanzania (CCM) were nominated, and some were actually elected. Yet because the
full election result~ were not reported, it
was impossible to know the extent to
which the opposition had succeeded in wresting local-council seats from the
CCM, and how strong the opposition parties were nationally. It is difficult to
regard such an election as “free and fair,” but might it not pass as
“acceptable?”
Making
Analytical Distinctions
These and other cases make
it clear that it is difficult—perhaps impossible—to establish precise
guidelines ‘ for assessing elections wherever they occur.
Nevertheless, it is possible to establish some analytical distinctions.
If we consider the two main
dimensions of freedom and fairness, it seems evident that some elections can be
characterized as free and fair, even if they are not perfect. All or almost all
elections in well-established democracies presumably fit this description. In
these cases, however, there is no perceived need to invite international
observers, making this first category mainly of academic interest.
It is also evident that
some ejections are not “free and fair’~ owing to the violation of a large
number of key criteria. In many cases the countries conducting such elections
do not even bother to invite international observers, who would in any case be
unlikely to come, for fear” of being seen as endorsing the elections. In other
cases, observers may declare the election not free and fair. Albania’s
parliamentary balloting of May 1996 is a recent case in point. Most
village-committee elect ion in the People’s Republic of China also fall into
this category. Between the extremes, however, lie many cases in which elections cannot be
labeled ‘free and fair” because of any number of short-comings, but in which it
would be unreasonable explicitly to declare them not “free and fair.”
Perhaps they are free in a formal sense, but fairness is limited in practice—or
perhaps they are free only to some extent, but rather fairly conducted within
those particular limits.
When observers take
circumstances into account and adopt a broad view – especially in terms of the
possibility of progress towards greater political competition and
participation - they may deem such elections “acceptable” even if they fall
short of being “free and fair.” These are not only the most difficult cases to
assess, but also the ones that international observers are most likely to
witness: The governments in these countries are eager to obtain the
international community’s stamp of approval as a means of boosting their
internal legitimacy and gaining / external recognition.
In practice, then,
elections and referendums are most likely to fall within the shaded area
(between curves a and c) of Figure 1, representing balloting that is neither
clearly free and fair nor clearly not free and fair, but acceptable when
technical limitations and prospects for progress toward democracy are taken
into account. In these cases, analysis of the application of a country’s
election law should take into account not only the criteria listed in Table 1,
but other factors that may help observers determine how strictly those criteria
should be applied. For example, if the election is the first in a country
undergoing a transition from authoritarianism to democracy, a relatively loose
application of the criteria may be indicated (curve a). On the other hand, if
there is reason to believe that the authorities have rigged the election, a
stricter application is justified (curve b). Even under more favorable
conditions, it is neither reasonable nor methodologically feasible to insist on
complete fulfillment of all the criteria before declaring an election or a
referendum “free and fair.” Something less (curve c) may suffice, as long as
basic freedoms exist, the election law is for the most part applied
impartially, and the main competitors have reasonable access to campaign
resources and the media.
A B C
+
Fair
-
-
Free +
Given the prevalence of elections and referendums that fall within the shaded area (between curves a and c), these special considerations deserve close attention. Because of the difficulty of distinguishing clearly between the dimensions of “free” and “fair,” assessments of such ballots can be represented by a straight line connecting the two most extreme points (the diagonal line in Figure 1). Thus the crucial point is where the diagonal leaves the shaded area (in a southwestern direction): it is here that we find the threshold between “acceptable” and “not acceptable.”
In determining the
acceptability of a given election, observers should focus on the degree of
conformance to the country’s election law and related regulations, considering
not just election-day event but also the periods before and after the
balloting. Also important are whether the preferences of the voters have been
adequately expressed and what contribution the electoral process has made to
the overall process of –democratization.
Yet another issue to consider is the closeness of the
electoral race. Should observers be more
permissive in cases in which the winner triumphs by a wide margin, possibly
indicating that irregularities would not have affected the outcome? This
argument, while plausible, is nevertheless problematic. Even huge wins can be
manufactured moreover, the distinction between wide and narrow margins is
subjective. Finally, given the
importance of elections as learning opportunities for voters as well as for
candidates, political parties, and election authorities, a strong case can be
made for not setting electoral standards too low in newly emerging democracies.
A Complex Process
The phrase “free and
fair” cannot denote compliance with a fixed, universal standard of electoral
competition: No such standard exists, ‘and the complexity of the electoral
process makes the notion of any simple formula unrealistic. Election
observation requires the simultaneous use of multiple scales to achieve valid
and reliable measurements of complex phenomena. These problems especially
affect the large segment of elections that are neither clearly free and fair
nor clearly not free and fair.
Election observers,
therefore, face a dilemma. They might simply avoid using the phrase “free and
fair,” but at the cost of opening the door to its use by others who have less
knowledge or understanding of the situation. Alternatively, observers can elect
to use the phrase as convenient shorthand, but at the cost of exposing
themselves to all manner of criticism grounded in intellectual or moral
considerations.
This does not mean,
however, that election observation and assessment are hopeless tasks; it is
indeed possible to draw general conclusions about how best to conduct such
activities. In the borderline cases described above—the crucial “in-between”
category—observers should identify their evaluation criteria as clearly as
possible while at the same time acknowledging that, their conclusions rest to
some degree on estimates and subjective judgments. In arriving at a conclusion
it is
vital that they consider whether electoral competition shows qualitative
improvements over previous elections (especially in terms of the freedom dimension
and the regulatory aspect of the fairness dimension) of course, it goes without
saying that the course of events should reflect the preferences of the
electorate.
The fulfillment of this last criterion is one reason
for the widespread acceptance of the IEC’s designation of the April 1994
elections in South Africa as “substantially free and fair.”20 This
factor is also emphasized by Guy Goodwin-Gill, who tries to strike a balance
between explicit standards (which he claims do indeed exist) and what he calls
“the special conditions of the general situation”—that is, whether the
elections reflect the will of the people and are conducted in a positive atmosphere.21
The decision to declare an election
“acceptable” also involves the election observer’s willingness to enter into a
dialogue, not with the political authorities of the country in question, but
with himself as to the possibilities of the situation. If the election, despite
irregularities, seems to reflect progress toward a more democratic government,
observers may choose to give it the benefit of the doubt. This may displease
more moralistic observers who take a black-and-white view of the world, but so
be it.
This essay has sought to develop a
checklist with greater practical application than the ones that have emerged so
far. Yet we do not consider it possible to develop a set of guidelines that is
equally applicable to all elections and referendums in emerging democracies.
The September 1996 elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina provide a good illustration
of the complexity of the electoral process and the difficulty of rendering a
final judgment. Before polling day, many freedoms were grossly violated, both
in the Bosnian Federation and in Republika Srpska. Among them was the freedom
of movement, which is usually taken for granted and therefore not included on
checklists of assessment criteria. The election authorities were, of course,
aware of this state of affairs, but decided to proceed cautiously in order to
avoid jeopardizing the entire electoral process, which was seen as crucial to
achieving peace and stability in the long term. Other major pre-election
problems concerned voter registration, freedom of speech, media access, and
intimidation of voters. On polling day itself, local reports of orderly
elections abounded; at the counting stage, however, rumors of fraud in some
areas began to circulate.
Questions can also be raised about the situation after polling day, especially with regard to the electoral authorities’ willingness to address complaints and the acceptance of the election results. Of course, the problems that arose in the latter area may have been due to some people’s refusal to acknowledge the legitimacy of the new political institutions.
—
On the whole,
then, the evidence would seem to indicate that
the elections
in Bosnia-Herzegovina were not free and fair, or even acceptable. Yet they were
accepted by the international community owing to their presumed importance for
stability and peace in the region. The lesson is clear: Elections vary so much
from one case to another, with new and complicated political situations
constantly arising, that previous observation experiences can provide only
limited help.
—
—
Despite the rapid
growth of election observation over the past decade, the task of establishing
criteria for evaluating elections still has a long way to go.
I.Giovanni Sartort, Concept
Mtxformation in Comparative Politic\, Political Science Review 64
(December 1970): 1034.
2.A good overview of
such efforts is provided in Yves Beigbeder, International Moni. taring
of Plebiscites, Referenda and National Elections: Self-Determination and Transition to
Democracy (Dordrecht, the Netherlands:
Martinus Nijhoff. 1994), 94—143.
3.Jon M. Ebersole, “The
United Nations Response to Requests for Assistance in Electoral Matters,” Virginia
Journal of International Law 13 (Fall 1992): 94. See also Beigbeder, International
Monitoring of Plebiscites. Referenda and National Elections.
4.Larry
Garber and Clark Gibson, Review of United Nations Electoral 1992—93 (Project
INT/9l/033. United Nations Development Programme, 18 August 1993).
5 Ebercole. “United Nations Response”:
Jennifer McCoy, Larry Garber, and Robert Pastor Pollwatching and Peacemaking.” Journal
of Democracy 2 (Fall 1991): 02—14.
6. See also Lessons Learnt—International
Election Observation. Seventeen Organizations Share Experiences on Electoral
Observation (Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral
Assistance, 1995), 13.
7. Jergen Eiklit, “Is the Degree of Electoral
Democratization Measurable? Experiences from Bulgaria, Kenya. Latvia, Mongolia
and Nepal,” in David Bcetham, ed,. Defining and Measuring Democracy (London:
Sage, 1994). 89—Ill.
8.
Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, Free and Fair Elections: International Law and Practice
(Geneva: Inter-Parliamentary
Union. 1994), 27—80: William C. Kimhcrling, A Rational Approach to Evaluating
Voter Registration. in John C. Courtney. cd.. Registering Voters.
Comparative Perspectives (Cambridge, Mass.: Center for International Affairs.
Harvard
University, 1991). 3—Il.
9. A good discussion of this point is round in
Georg Srnensen. Democracy and Democratization: Processes and Prospects in a
Changing World (Boulder, Cola.:
Westview. 1993).
10. Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl,
‘What Democracy Is ... and Is Not, Journal of Democracy 2 (Summer
1991): 75—88.
II. Robert A. Dahl. Democracy and Its Critics (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 221. DahI actually refers not to
“democracies” but to polyarchics. We use the term “democracy” here both for the
ideology and for existing political regimes in order to conform to ordinary
usage.